INTRODUCTION
The extremely high cost of orbital assets and irrecoverable nature of orbital operations makes orbital mishap prevention a critical component of orbital systems. For satellites, a catastrophic space mishap means complete loss of the satellite, and a critical space mishap means permanent loss or degradation of any mission capability. Satellite mission degradation includes a shortened useful life, degraded mission data, or reduced system performance. In accordance with AFI 91-202, AFSPC Supplement 1, orbital mishap prevention begins with an Orbital Safety assessment in the earliest phases of a program when considerations of safety requirements can be cost-effectively incorporated into the design. This assessment must include an on-orbit hazard analysis that identifies risks to safety during orbital insertion, on-orbit testing, on-orbit operations, safemode entry/exit, functional recovery/restoration, re-entry, and disposal. All defense satellite contractors must perform a formal on-orbit hazard analysis that covers, at a minimum, the following areas:
• Orbital Debris Minimization. Orbital systems should be designed to minimize the generation of orbital debris during and after their service life. At a minimum, establish routine state-of-health reports and have contingency plans prepared. Orbital Debris Minimization should cover, at a minimum, the following areas: ─ Development of a formal end-of-life safing and disposal program for each satellite system. Per NSS 03-01, Section AP1.18, System Disposal [3] : "At the end of its useful life, a system shall be demilitarized and disposed in accordance with the legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety (including explosive safety), security, and the environment." ─ Assessment of the potential permanent loss or degradation of any mission of an individual satellite, as defined by operational or test mission criteria, occurring during early orbit checkout/calibration. ─ Assessment of the potential placement of a satellite into an incorrect orbit which results in the permanent loss or degradation of any mission of an individual satellite, as defined by operational or test mission criteria. ─ Assessment of all potential significant satellite malfunctions which will likely be declared a space mishap by the convening authority. ─ Assessment of potential death, injury, or illness of persons in space caused by an Air Force space system mishap or debris associated with that system.
• Collision Avoidance. Operators should take appropriate action to minimize the risk of on-orbit collisions with other satellites or space debris. Collision Avoidance should cover, at a minimum, the following areas: ─ Maintaining separation of functional and nonfunctional space objects through coordinated launch window management, accurate tracking and orbital element set updating; and coordination of planned orbit changes and evasive maneuvering to preserve operational space systems and to avoid the generation of additional space debris. ─ As a result of a collision with a man-made, nonhostile object, an assessment should be made of the potential permanent loss or degradation of any mission of an individual satellite, as defined by operational or test mission capability criteria.
• Space Environment. Orbital systems should be designed to minimize damage due to natural phenomena such as meteoroids, solar radiation, spacecraft charging and high energy cosmic radiation, solar flares, etc.
• Ground-based errors. Contractors should consider ground-based errors in their Systems Engineering processes. Orbital System Safety Programs should identify and minimize human factor and software risks, including crew rest restrictions, duty restrictions, and local factors. The assessment should include identification of the potential permanent loss or degradation of any mission of an individual satellite, as defined by operational or test mission criteria, as a result of groundbased errors caused by humans, software, training, or management deficiencies.
• Directed Energy Clearing House. Programs or experiments using directed energy, either ground or space-based, should take appropriate action to minimize hazards or interference with spacecraft or the general public and property on the earth's surface or in the atmosphere. Section 9.3.2 of AFI 91-204, AFSPC Supplement 1, SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS [4] , defines the categories of orbital mishaps which may occur during satellite on-orbit operations. However, the utility of AFI 91-204 as a tool for challenging the way contractors perform on-orbit hazard analysis is contingent on AFSPC adopting the official position that applicability of AFI 91-204 includes the prevention of potential mishaps.
RESPONSIBILITIES
It is the responsibility of Acquisition Program Manager to ensure that AFI policies are reflected in the contract requirements. Furthermore, each Government acquisition authority is responsible for implementing a System Safety Management Plan (SSMP) that focuses on AFI requirements and is implemented in a timely manner. The SSMP should explain how the acquisition authority plans to meet its System/Space Safety mishap prevention responsibilities throughout the satellite life cycle. For examples of mishaps to be prevented throughout the satellite life cycle see Table 1 , which was obtained from the Air Force Safety Center. Note that these mishaps come from the whole satellite life cycle, including contractor plant operations, ground processing, launch, and on-orbit operations. It is the responsibility of each satellite contractor to establish and execute an SSPP which meets the tailored requirements of MIL-STD-882C.
.THE SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLAN
The SSMP should proceed from National Security Space (NSS) definitions and needs, not contractor interpretations. For example, a common business practice for contractors is to assume risks to the mission are not orbital safety issues. Another common business practice for contractors is to consider the separation distances between space vehicles as the only on-orbit hazard. These are inadequate assessments of space system safety hazards during the orbital phase. Per DODD 3100.10, Section 4.11.7, Spaceflight Safety [5] :
" The SSMP should be checked for completeness against the guidance for System Safety Program Plans found in MIL-STD-882C, Task 102. The main requirements in Task 102 include a planned approach for task accomplishment, qualified people to accomplish the tasks, authority to implement tasks through all levels of management, and appropriate commitment of resources (both manning and funding) to assure tasks are completed. Also, the manpower loading and funding required for the acquisition authority's oversight of the System Safety Program should be planned for the life cycle of the program. It would be not be possible to estimate and manage the required System Safety resources without properly scoping the tasks to be accomplished by the Government's representatives. Therefore, the acquisition authority should plan on having sufficient manpower to review all potential system hazards, identified throughout the satellite life cycle, for completeness and adequate tracking.
THE SEVEN BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ORBITAL SAFETY
The following principles were drawn from the experiences of the authors and are listed in increasing order of importance.
A. Base SSP Management on Strong Acquisition Authority Oversight
In cases where the SSP is based on a contractor's legacy ownership of total system performance responsibility (TSPR), sometimes the contractor makes critical decisions regarding the SSP without approval or input from the acquisition authority. The positive aspect of this type of management philosophy is it can be bid at lower-cost because the contractor can establish a "down-sized" SSP that is tailored to meet a particular budget. A "down-sized" SSP means the contractor reduces the scope of the tasks used to meet contractual System Safety requirements. The negative aspect of this type of management philosophy is it can lead to some of the highercost Orbital Safety requirements not being met. In contrast, USAF Orbital Safety policy requires that the acquisition authority use strong oversight to manage the SSP in accordance with the contractual requirements. In accordance with AFI 91-202 (AFSC Supplement 1), the System Program Director (SPD) is ultimately responsible for Orbital Safety assurance. The SPD appoints a System Safety Manager (SSM) to act on his behalf, and the SPD chairs the System Safety Group (SSG) which oversees the SSP throughout the life of the system. This type of Government-centric management is especially useful when the System Safety effort competes for priority and limited resources with other Specialty Engineering efforts. For that very reason, the SMC Safety Office has fully endorsed the adoption of the following policy by acquisition authorities:
"Air Force policy has established that activities which support the implementation of Safety requirements that are driven by legal statures, National Policies and International Agreement should always be considered top-priority." Even though contractors are not legally bound to comply with this policy, it works in behalf of Government/contractor relations when efforts are made to meet the Customer's needs.
B. Use Computerized Tools to Aid System Safety Assessments
In cases where the system safety knowledge and/or training of individuals that are responsible for implementing the SSPP is substandard or out-dated, sometimes the contractor limits all safety tasks to manual methods only. The positive aspect of limiting all Orbital Safety assessments to manual approaches is they can be bid at lower cost because they do not involve the purchase of any computerized tools or special training.
The negative aspect of limiting Orbital Safety assessments to manual approaches is they can lead to some of the more difficult safety design requirements not being met. For example, assessing dual-fault tolerance of safety-critical functions in satellite systems is difficult and labor-intensive using manual approaches only. Accordingly, an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort requires the contractor to use appropriate computerized tools to the greatest extent practical to assure cost-effective implementation of dual-fault tolerance assessment. Computerized Fault Tree Analysis [6] , or an equivalent methodology, is required to assess the dualfault tolerance of complex satellite system designs in a costeffective manner. Computer generated fault trees can be constructed manually or automatically using a computerized functional diagram modeling (FDM) tool [7] . In either case, the processing of fault trees to identify the cut-sets of basic events is performed via computer-aided analysis. Also, hazard report database software allows the System Safety Engineer to correlate large amounts of data, which may lead to uncovering new hazards that otherwise would remain hidden until a mishap occurs.
C. Break down the SSP into Discrete Activities that are Properly Linked
In cases where the SSP consists mostly or entirely of level of effort (LOE) tasks, sometimes the contractor will choose not to include System Safety milestones in the integrated master schedule (IMS) for planned activities. The positive aspect of this type of SSP is it can be bid at lower-cost because it does not involve the scheduling or burdening of any activities or defining uniform criteria for determining the percent of task complete. The negative aspect of this type of SSP is that many of the activities that safety engineers engage in are reactive. Continuously working in a reactive mode usually leads to a feeling of being "overloaded" with activities. In contrast, an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort requires the contractor to break down the SSP into discrete predecessor and successor activities that are properly linked, scheduled, and burdened. The acquisition authority uses the IMS to facilitate non-intrusive oversight of the SSP.
D. Integrate Hazard Disposition with the Program Risk
Management Process In cases where the SSPP and the Risk Management Plan are developed independently, sometimes the contractor will handle hazards with less rigor and management involvement than risks. The positive aspect of this type of hazard disposition approach is it can be bid at lower-cost because it does not involve the approval of any risk mitigation plans that would be a drain on the management reserve budget. The negative aspect of this type of hazard disposition is it facilitates inappropriate disposition of hazards due to lack of committed program funding. In contrast, an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort requires the contractor to integrate hazard disposition with the program Risk Management Process. A crucial step toward this integration is the conversion of the hazard severity definitions in Section 4 of MIL-STD-882C (see Table 2 ) to the failure severity/consequence categories commonly used by Risk Management Programs. Table 3 provides an example of commonly used failure severity/consequence categories. The result of this conversion is the 5X5 standard risk matrix in Figure 1 . The objective is to use standard Risk Management practices to identify appropriate dispositions for anticipated hazards, and to track those dispositions from approval through closure. System Safety uses the Hazard Log to independently track hazard dispositions that double as risk mitigation plans. The Hazard Log is the prepared tool for this purpose because it documents all anticipated hazards including hazards that are approved residual risk. 
Negligible IV
Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less than minor system or environmental damage.
E. Use Safety Design Criteria to Drive the Reliability Design Philosophy
In cases where the Orbital Safety part of the System Safety Program is started significantly late, sometimes contractors ignore the dual-fault tolerance safety design criterion that is called out in MIL-STD-882C, Appendix C, Section 70.1.1b, and establish a "minimize" single point failure modes (SPFMs) design philosophy for the entire system. The positive aspect of this type of design philosophy is it can be bid at lower cost because "minimize" means that some single point failure modes are allowed as long as the system design meets its quantitative reliability requirements. The negative aspect of this type of design philosophy is it usually based on "handbook" reliability predictions [8] which should not be used in hazard risk assessments because the predictions do not accurately represent the satellite's operational reliability characteristics. In general, "handbook" reliability predictions Figure 1 . Standard Risk Matrix result in overly pessimistic predictions for random-failure items and overly optimistic predictions for infant-mortality and wear-out items. When contractual tailoring of MIL-STD-882C calls for using the hazard risk assessment matrix in Appendix A, Figure 1 , as the criteria for prioritizing hazards for corrective action, the Government acquisition authority is directly involved in safety-critical design decisions. In this case, contractors are inclined to use an accurate reliability prediction methodology to assess the quantitative risk associated with non-compliant safety design conditions. Often, the contractor's Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Program makes no distinction between the severities of catastrophic single point failure modes (SPFMs) and mission-critical SPFMs. Both types of SPFMs are classified as Severity Level 1 (mission-critical) failure modes in the FMECA. In other words, the FMECA does not rank the severity of an SPFM that could cause an operational satellite to become space debris higher than the severity of an SPFM that could cause loss of the payload sensor. This simplified FMECA approach suits acquisition programs which have a system design specification that calls for "minimizing" SPFMs only as necessary to meet the system reliability prediction requirement. In theory, the Reliability Engineer could argue for retaining an SPFM that can cause an operational satellite to become space debris if the system reliability prediction requirement is met without eliminating said SPFM.
System Safety makes a clear distinction between the severities of catastrophic SPFMs and mission-critical SPFMs. MIL-STD-882C, Appendix C, not only classifies SPFMs which can cause an operational satellite to become space debris as "unacceptable design conditions", but all combinations of two independent failures and events which can cause significant space debris are classified as "unacceptable design conditions" also. It would not be practical or cost-effective to attempt to eliminate all SPFMs and dual failure modes which can cause an operational satellite to become space debris. To help bound the safety design effort, MIL-STD-882C (Tailored) defines a threshold for accepting safety design violations which have a very low or negligible probability of occurrence. The end result is costeffective reduction in the risk of injury and damage to an acceptable level while at the same time assuring safety-critical functions are dual-fault tolerant, or appropriate rationale provided for approving any exceptions. On-orbit mishap history shows it is well worth the extra effort to design a dual fault-tolerant safing capability. Smart engineers and operators may figure out a way to revive a "safed" satellite, but no one can revive a "dead" satellite.
F. Understanding and Reporting Hazards is Everyone's Responsibility
In cases where the value-added aspects of System Safety are not fully understood or appreciated, sometimes the contractor limits the hazard analysis to a one-person effort. The positive aspect of this type of hazard analysis is it can be bid at lower-cost because it mostly involves reusing existing hazard analysis reports for Occupational Safety, Range Safety, and Ground Safety. The often repeated rationale for limiting the hazard analysis to a one-person effort is, "Our normal Mission Assurance tasks will mitigate the types of hazards that System Safety looks for." The negative aspect of this type of safety effort is it allows contractors to isolate the System Safety effort from the main stream of Systems Engineering activities, which effectively "stove-pipes" the assessment of hazards and development of contractual safety reports. In contrast, an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort requires that everyone in the program understand and identify hazards. The responsibility for identifying and mitigating anticipated hazards that may lead to a mishap of catastrophic or critical severity flows from the contractual tailoring of MIL-STD-882C on the contractor's side, and from AFI 91-202 (Supplement 1) on the acquisition authority's side. System Safety should facilitate the understanding and reporting of hazards at all levels through instructional seminars, standardized forms, databases, and lessons learned. Formal peer reviews of the system design could become an effective tool for identifying hazards if contractors would make it a standard practice to generate detailed and accurate functional and physical illustrations and narrations of that design. Even conceptual designs can be illustrated and narrated in detail with regard to functional intent.
G. Implement a Contract-Compliant Product Life Cycle SSPP
In cases where the System safety Program Plan (SSPP) is tailored to focus on tasks that the safety staff is familiar with doing, sometimes the contractor will focus on Range Safety and overlook some explicit or implicit Orbital Safety requirements if they involve tasks that fall outside the scope of "normal business practices". The positive aspect of this type of SSPP is it can be bid at lower-cost because it does not involve any tasks that the safety staff is not familiar with doing. The negative aspect of this type of SSPP is it may allow one or more product life cycle System Safety requirements to be overlooked. In contrast, an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort requires the contractor to implement a fully contract-compliant product life cycle SSPP. However, if the acquisition authority is not familiar with an explicit or implicit product life cycle System Safety requirement, then failure to meet an overlooked System Safety requirement might not be discovered until it's too late to change the design, or until a catastrophic or critical mishap occurs.
Based on one popular interpretation of the Orbital Safety requirements in AFI 91-202, there exits an implied hierarchical dependency among the five Orbital Safety areas as is shown in Figure 2 . In this Orbital Safety area hierarchical schema the most catastrophic satellite hazard condition is a failure mode or event that could cause an operational satellite to become space debris, which in turn, could endanger other operational satellites.
It is the responsibility of the Government acquisition authority to ensure that the Orbital Safety requirement for orbital debris minimization is not overlooked in the contractor's System Safety Program.
ManTech SRS Technologies Incorporated developed a guide titled, The Basic US Air Force SSMP Activities versus Applicable SBIRS SSMP Activities Gap Analysis (Draft) [9] , which Government acquisition authorities can use to identify all the applicable System Safety requirements. 
CONCLUSIONS
The path to an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort is unfamiliar territory to many persons on both the Government side and contractor side in the defense satellite industry. This paper describes how to tailor the SSMP to aid an acquisition authority in enforcing Air Force Orbital Safety policy. Specifically, SSMP tailoring should capture the seven basic principles of Orbital Safety as described in this paper. A properly tailored SSMP provides a detailed "roadmap" for an acquisition authority to follow in assuring an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort.
